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Scientific Fictionalism and the Problem of 
Inconsistency in Nietzsche
JUSTIN REMHOF
ABSTRACT: In this article, I begin to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism 
in order to make headway toward resolving a central interpretive issue in his 
epistemology. For Nietzsche knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, 
this is a result of his puzzling view that truths are somehow false. I argue that 
Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims are falsifications because he embraces a 
scientific fictionalist view according to which inexact representations, which 
are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is not inconsistent.
KEYWORDS: science, knowledge, truth, fictionalism 
Fictionalism plays a significant role in philosophy today, with defenses span-ning mathematics, morality, ordinary objects, truth, modality, and more.1 
Fictionalism in the philosophy of science is also gaining attention, due in particu-
lar to the revival of Hans Vaihinger’s work from the early twentieth century and 
to heightened interest in idealization in scientific practice.2 Vaihinger maintains 
that there is an ubiquity of fictions in science and, among other things, argues 
that Nietzsche supports the position. Yet, while contemporary commentators 
have focused on fictionalism in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, his view of fic-
tions in science has remained largely unexamined.3
In this article, I begin to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism in order 
to make headway toward resolving a central interpretive issue in his epistemol-
ogy. For Nietzsche knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, this is a 
result of his puzzling view that truths are somehow false. He says, for instance, 
“Truth is the kind of error without which a particular kind of living creature 
could not live [Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrtum, ohne welche eine bestimmte 
Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben könnte]” (KSA 11:34[253], see also GS 
265).4 It appears that claims we consider to be perfectly true are actually false. 
Call this the Problem of Inconsistency. Failing to find a solution to this prob-
lem would provide good reason to discard many of Nietzsche’s thoughts on 
 epistemology—his remarks would seem simply incoherent. In this paper, I argue 
that Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims are falsifications because he embraces a 
certain kind of scientific fictionalism. According to Nietzsche, we primarily look 
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to science (Wissenschaft)5 for knowledge of the world. I suggest that Nietzsche 
prefers a version of scientific fictionalism according to which inexact represen-
tations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is 
not inconsistent.
It is helpful to begin by making some basic distinctions in contemporary sci-
entific fictionalism. Fictionalism can be about language or ontology.6 Linguistic 
fictionalism is the thesis that sentences of a particular discourse are best under-
stood as saying something false—though usually useful—rather than true. An 
example is modal fictionalism, which holds that statements containing reference 
to possible worlds are not literally correct, but are instead convenient fictions. 
Linguistic fictionalists often retain the target discourse for practical purposes. 
Indeed, possible worlds talk serves many important functions in philosophy.
Ontological fictionalism is the thesis that the entities of a particular discourse 
do not exist. Error theorists about morality endorse ontological fictionalism. 
They hold that entities such as moral obligation and moral value fail to exist. 
Ontological fictionalists often claim that we are better off rejecting the target 
discourse. Accordingly, the error theorist contends that we should discard state-
ments that assume the existence of moral entities. Linguistic and ontological 
fictionalism are regularly defended in tandem. One might think that a particular 
statement is best understood as saying something false, for example, because its 
referent is nonexistent. Nonetheless, one can in principle be committed to one 
thesis without embracing the other. Linguistic fictionalists, for instance, need 
not hold that the entities of a particular discourse do not exist.
The distinction between linguistic and ontological fictionalism provides a 
basis for distinguishing two ways in which scientific representations could be 
considered false.7 A fictive representation about some entity is typically regarded 
as false because the entity, although real, is incorrectly described. An example is 
the ideal gas law, which idealizes the behavior of real gases. Fictive representa-
tions, which include idealizations, approximations, abstractions, and the like, are 
primarily evaluated by examining our language.8 Fictional representations, by 
contrast, are chiefly assessed in relation to our ontology. A fictional representa-
tion about some entity is thought to be false because there is no such entity in 
reality. Models of luminiferous ether, which were used in the nineteenth century 
to describe a medium for the propagation of light, are currently regarded as 
fictional. A representation can be fictive or fictional without being both.
Disagreement about how to treat the truth value of fictive representations 
leads some philosophers to deny that both fictive and fictional representations 
are necessarily false. Wide fictionalism is the thesis that both fictive and fictional 
representations are false, whereas narrow fictionalism is the thesis that only 
fictional representations are false.9 Narrow fictionalists maintain that inexact 
representations about real entities can be approximately true, while all represen-
tations about nonexistent entities are false. For example, narrow fictionalists hold 
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that the ideal gas law is true. Wide fictionalists believe inexact representations 
are literally false, similar to representations about entities that do not exist. These 
distinctions are helpful for understanding Nietzsche’s view of fictions in science. 
Nietzsche often claims that our cognitive perspectives, or those concerned with 
knowledge, contain false representations.10 I argue that Nietzsche is committed 
to narrow fictionalism, which protects his position from being inconsistent.
Nietzsche’s view that knowledge claims are falsifications emerges clearly 
from the following passages.11 In GM, he writes that “seeing becomes seeing 
something” by virtue of “active and interpreting forces,” and “there is only a 
perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’” (GM III:12).12 It appears 
that knowledge claims are interpretations. Later, he asserts that “the essence 
of interpreting” consists in activities such as “doing violence, pressing into 
orderly form, abbreviating, omitting, padding, fabricating, [and] falsifying 
[auf das Vergewaltigen, Zurechtschieben, Abkürzen, Weglassen, Ausstopfen, 
Ausdichten, Umfälschen]” (GM III:24, translation modified). One feature of 
interpretation is falsification. Consequently, knowledge claims are falsifications. 
Indeed, Nietzsche proclaims that “the best science [die beste Wissenschaft]” 
produces a “falsified world” (BGE 24, translation modified).
For Nietzsche, I contend, knowledge claims are falsifications because they are 
fictive representations. The passages in GM imply that interpretations target a 
real entity. We could not “press into orderly form,” for instance, something that 
does not exist (GM III:24). Nietzsche also retains epistemological discourse,13 
which, presumably, would not be the case if he thought there was no such thing 
as knowledge. Nietzsche therefore endorses the linguistic fictionalist thesis that 
knowledge claims—those produced by scientific means—somehow misrepre-
sent the world. Knowledge claims are fictive.
Nietzsche believes knowledge claims are fictive because they are simplifica-
tions.14 He often links knowledge with simplification, and simplification with 
falsification. He notes, “the entire apparatus for knowledge is an apparatus for 
abstraction and simplification” (KSA 11:26[61]), and consciousness is presented 
with “experiences [. . .] that have all been simplified, made easy to survey 
and grasp, thus falsified” (KSA 11:37[4], first emphasis added). For Nietzsche 
“‘illusoriness’ is a trimmed and simplified world” (KSA 13:14[93]).15 And, “The 
best science [die beste Wissenschaft] seeks most to keep us in this simplified, 
thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world” (BGE 
24, translation modified, second emphasis added). Why does Nietzsche under-
stand simplifications as falsifications? Simplified representations are inexact, 
and inexact representations are not literally true.16
Nietzsche seems to believe that knowledge claims are fictive because all repre-
sentation within our cognitive perspectives is inexact. This follows from his view 
of representational consciousness. On Nietzsche’s account, conscious represen-
tation simplifies because representational consciousness itself emerges from the 
JNS 47.2_06_Remhof.indd   240 03/05/16   8:00 AM
SCIENTIFIC FICTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENCY  241
need to communicate using concepts (GS 354). Concepts expedite reference by 
abstracting from differences among sensed particulars and applying generaliz-
ing designations to their similarities. According to Nietzsche, other features of 
representational consciousness, such as logic, mathematics, and something like 
the Kantian categories, function similarly. Logic and mathematics equalize by 
reducing differences to identities, and the categories subsume diverse informa-
tion from the senses under a small set of cognitive forms. Representational fea-
tures of consciousness simplify sensory information to help us navigate complex 
experience. To some extent, then, Nietzsche believes conscious representation 
is always inexact: “all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough cor-
ruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization” (GS 354; see also 
KSA 13:11[113]). This understanding of representational consciousness implies 
that all representation within our cognitive perspectives is fictive.
It could be argued that Nietzsche’s view of representational consciousness 
leads him to reject knowledge for creatures like us altogether. Perhaps Nietzsche 
thinks imprecise representations are false simpliciter. If he were to embrace this 
position, he would endorse wide fictionalism, which, in this particular case, 
would entail the view that all conscious representations are false. It would fol-
low that Nietzsche denies truth.17 By contrast, I argue that Nietzsche endorses 
narrow fictionalism, which holds that inexact representations can be true.
To see why my interpretation is better than the alternative, consider an impor-
tant feature of Nietzsche’s understanding of truth. He writes, “Truth is the kind 
of error without which a particular kind of living creature could not live” (KSA 
11: 34[253], see also GS 265). Those who claim that Nietzsche rejects truth 
would likely interpret this by concentrating on the qualification “without which a 
particular kind of living creature could not live.” It could be the case that “truth” 
merely picks out a psychological attitude toward one’s beliefs. On this reading, 
although we have a strong psychological need to consider our beliefs true, truth 
simply does not exist.18 Nietzsche could have made this clearer by saying, “The 
illusion that there is truth is something creatures like us cannot live without.” 
This interpretation dissolves the Problem of Inconsistency—if there is no truth, 
there is no problem. The difficulty with this reading, however, is that Nietzsche 
asserts that truths exist. He declares, for instance, “plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, 
unchristian, [and] immoral . . . truths do exist” (GM I:1). In the Nachlass he adds, 
“The belief that truth does not exist, the nihilist’s belief, is a great stretching of 
the limbs for someone who, as a warrior of knowledge, is constantly at struggle 
with so many ugly truths. For the truth is ugly” (KSA 13:11[108]). This assumes 
truth exists, and Nietzsche clearly casts himself as the “warrior of knowledge” 
against the “nihilists” who deny truth. Nietzsche is no “nihilist” about truth. 
The position that Nietzsche rejects truth therefore fails to do justice to the texts.
Someone unsympathetic with the view that Nietzsche denies truth might 
attempt to explain the claim that “Truth is a kind of error” by arguing that 
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Nietzsche uses the predicates “true” and “false” to refer to different but 
compatible domains. R. Lanier Anderson, for example, follows Richard 
Schacht in thinking that “the paradoxes generated by Nietzsche’s denials of 
the  possibility of truth are to be resolved by distinguishing different senses of 
‘true’ and ‘false.’”19 Anderson argues that Nietzsche rejects truth conceived 
as correspondence to a realm that exists independently of our cognitive orga-
nization of experience and accepts truth conceived as internal to our epistemic 
practices, specifically science.20 This reading helps clarify many apparently 
inconsistent passages.21 However, it cannot explain Nietzsche’s claim that 
truth is a “kind” of falsification. The German is “Art,” meaning “type” or 
“form,” and the idea that truth is a kind, type, or form of falsification makes 
sense only if “true” and “false” apply within the same domain. Nietzsche is 
suggesting that truth is a particular manner in which a claim is false, not that 
“true” and “false” refer to completely separate realms. Anderson’s reading 
that truth is possible only within our epistemic practices leaves unexplained 
why Nietzsche considers truths within our epistemic practices to be false. 
Thus, Anderson’s interpretation does not provide a solution to the Problem 
of Inconsistency.
On my view, when Nietzsche says “Truth is a kind of error,” he means that 
truths are a particular kind of inexact representation. Unfortunately, this read-
ing faces an immediate problem. Arguably, statements cannot be simultane-
ously true and false. However, Nietzsche rejects bivalence about truth. He asks, 
“Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of 
‘true’ and ‘false’? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it 
were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different ‘values,’ 
to use the language of painters?” (BGE 34). It seems best to understand truth as 
an approximate evaluation.
A representation is approximately true to the extent that what it describes is 
similar to the target described.22 To understand how approximately true state-
ments are evaluated, consider assessing the accuracy of maps as an analogy. 
Maps are representationally successful just in case they are accurate enough to 
satisfy some specified set of concerns in relation to representing some target. 
With respect to travel, for example, road maps are constructed to represent dis-
tances and omit information about atmospheric conditions, animal populations, 
and so on. Our interests are crucial for determining parameters that constitute 
representational success. Likewise, the application of an approximate repre-
sentation will be evaluated relative to some set of concerns. Our concerns help 
render the truth conditions of approximate representations determinate. To assess 
those conditions, then, we must delineate which interests are relevant, and to 
what degree, relative to representing some target. A representation is similar 
to its target only in approximations, just as a map is similar to its target only in 
certain respects.
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Nietzsche can consistently embrace the position that truth is approximate in 
conjunction with the position that representation within our cognitive perspec-
tives is always inexact. An inexact representation can be accurate insofar as 
the representation satisfies what we determine to be representational success. 
Consider the statement that celestial bodies such as planets exhibit hydrostatic 
equilibrium. To say planets exhibit hydrostatic equilibrium is to say planets are 
massive enough for the force of their own gravity to dominate over the pressure 
of the forces that bind their physical structure. This balance makes them round. 
An object must exhibit hydrostatic equilibrium to be a planet—a rough, jag-
ged object will not qualify. Importantly, calculating hydrostatic equilibrium for 
celestial bodies involves using approximate variables. For example, one must 
hold constant the fluctuating pressure of the materials that compose planets. 
As a result, the statement that celestial bodies like planets exhibit hydrostatic 
equilibrium is inexact. The statement is also accurate, though, provided that 
approximate measures are employed in calculations that satisfy our concerns 
for what counts as equilibrium. This suggests that literally false statements can 
be true in an approximate sense.
One might object to the view that for Nietzsche representations within our 
cognitive perspectives can be approximately true. It is reasonable to think that 
evaluating the truth conditions of an inexact representation requires acquaintance 
with the relevant exact representation. If so, Nietzsche may be in trouble. He 
seems to believe that exact representations are unintelligible. The conditions 
that facilitate conscious representation render such representations impossible.
Nietzsche would likely claim that there are two conditions that must be met 
for an approximate representation to be evaluated as true. The first turns on 
his remark that “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘know-
ing’” (GM III:12). We cannot represent something fully independent of our 
representations of it. Representations cannot be compared to an unrepresented 
world, but only to other representations, whether perceptual or descriptive. So, 
representations can be exact and inexact only in relation to other representations. 
If so, then Nietzsche can claim that exact representations are possible while 
embracing the position that representation is ubiquitously inexact. Exactness is 
not determined by precisely specified objects independent of our representations 
of them. In order to evaluate an inexact representation as accurate it must be 
recognized that there are no exact representations only in the sense that there are 
no representations of precisely specified objects independent of our representa-
tions of them as such.23
The second condition that must be met to evaluate the truth of an approximate 
representation turns on the idea that our interests partially constitute the con-
straints for assessing whether a representation is accurate. One must recognize 
that representations may be otherwise because they are indexed to some set of 
concerns not relevant for some problem. For example, physicists interested in 
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hydrostatic equilibrium work by abstracting away from the irregular features 
of a planet’s crust, while those interested in topography may aim to detail such 
attributes. Representations are exact and inexact only in relation to other repre-
sentations indexed to differently specified sets of concerns. These two conditions 
provide Nietzsche with the resources to evaluate the truth conditions of inexact 
representations.
I have argued that Nietzsche holds that knowledge claims are falsifications 
because he embraces the narrow fictionalist position that representation within 
our cognitive perspectives is inexact and truth is approximate. Nietzsche rejects 
the wide fictionalist view that all imprecise representations are simply false. He 
thinks we can attain truths about the world while, in some sense, always working 
with inexact representations. In the notes, he writes, “‘Truth’: this, according 
to my way of thinking, does not necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but 
in the most fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to 
one another” (KSA 11:38[4], see also KSA 11:36[23]; HH I:16; GS 265). Such 
apparently paradoxical remarks, which are numerous in Nietzsche’s corpus, 
make good sense on the reading that Nietzsche endorses narrow fictionalism. 
This commitment, I have suggested, saves his epistemology from the Problem 
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